The strategic purpose of individual augmentee officers for junior partners in multinational military operations

ABSTRACT

This article examines the strategic purpose of Individual Augmentee Officers (IAOs) for junior partners in multinational military operations through an exploratory case study of Danish IAOs in Iraq and South Sudan between 2014 and 2017. IAOs are individual officers who are moved from their normal functions to be seconded to other units of the armed forces of their own or another country or an international institution. The study concludes that IAOs function as strategically important, yet not necessarily indispensable, supplements to military contingents in several ways: making tangible contributions to the overall mission (contributing), gaining access to information, knowledge, and experience (learning), and lobbying decision-making processes within mission headquarters (lobbying). The usefulness of IAOs depends on whether the junior partner has specific interests and a significant presence in the theatre and whether the mission is conducted as a UN mission, a NATO mission, or an ad hoc coalition.     

US grand strategy and the origins of the developmental state

ABSTRACT

Scholars have credited a model of state-led capitalism called the ‘developmental state’ with producing the economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This article examines how the developmental state was shaped by the Cold War. US grand strategy focused on accelerating economic development among allies that were under the greatest threat from Communist China and North Korea. American aid agencies became involved in the process of state-building in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and supported economic planning. I verify this claim by contrasting US policies on Taiwan with US policies in the Philippines, which faced a weaker Communist threat.     

A nation-in-the-making,in arms: control of force,strategy and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions

At the core of waging war and strategy is the creation, control and use of force. This article investigates the volunteer battalions that mobilized in Ukraine during the spring of 2014. It contextualizes the volunteer phenomenon and focuses on the state strategies to establish control over these militias. As ambiguous entities arising from a situation characterized by rapid social change – revolution and war – the volunteer battalions threatened existing hierarchies and questioned state authority. The situation was exacerbated by the war, which deviated from the expectations of Ukrainian combatants and Western military observers alike. The state nevertheless enjoyed a modicum of success in reining in the militias through four strategies of undermining, co-option, incorporation and coercion. While predominantly integrated into a more rigid category of paramilitary forces, the volunteers continue to play a role in both the Ukrainian society and security sector to the unforeseeable future.     

From show of force to naval presence,and back again: the U.S. Navy in the Baltic, 1982–2017

This article discusses roles and missions of the United States Navy with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea. That particular sea has gained renewed political and military attention following Russia's resurgent and increasingly hybrid-offensive foreign policy. Baltic nations, uncertain of what the future holds, ought to look at sea power and maritime missions in the Baltic, as well as US naval presence in Europe, to draw lessons for future posture.     

美军战略传播中的“叙事”策略

随着互联网技术的飞速发展,信息传播对国家政治、经济、外交和国防带来巨大冲击和影响。美军意识到传播叙事是政府和军队塑造形象、谋划战略、输出文化价值观的重要手段。美国从"重讲故事"的角度出发,将"叙事"包装成对外战略传播的新型方式,从思维认知、情感操控、舆论引导等方面强化对对手的心理威慑和影响,同时以新媒体为媒介扩大叙事传播的影响受众,进而达到物理打击所难以发挥的影响。     

Implementing the Global Strategy where it matters most: the EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographic scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS; so there is still scope for more clarity regarding the EU’s core strategic aims. This article argues that in addition to fostering internal cohesion, the EU’s strategic priority must involve stabilizing its own neighbourhood. This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit regarding the EU’s own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this problem as effectively as it could have. Therefore much more work will need to be done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the EUGS and related policy statements.     

军用机场阵地对抗不可预见作战的伪装策略

相对固定的军力部署会提前暴露军事意图。为避免此种情况，美军在2018年《国防战略报告》中提出要实现作战的不可预见性。未来美军不可预见的动态军事力量部署一定程度上增加了军事斗争准备难度。为提升军队机场阵地战场生存能力，有必要针对性地调整应对策略，增强对抗“不可预见作战”的能力。本文着眼军用机场阵地，从三个方面分析对抗不可预见作战的伪装策略：首先阐述不可预见作战的特点，其次分析在“不可预见作战”条件下，现有机场阵地在伪装方面的短板，最后提出对抗“不可预见作战”的伪装策略。通过分析认为，为对抗美军新的作战构想，军事机场阵地伪装策略应从战时应用调整为平战结合，应更加侧重平时的伪装训练和伪装工程建设。     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

Spaghetti: systems thinking and the US Army

In the mid-2000s, the United States Army was embroiled in counterinsurgency missions in Iraq and Afghanistan that required deeper understanding of local social systems. The Army turned to systems thinking and design thinking to model and understand the world, define problems, and develop approaches to strategic and operational challenges. However, the Army’s approach as expressed in publications and doctrine encourages the development of complicated, unsupported, and unfalsifiable hypotheses. The risk is that the Army will act on incorrect assumptions and develop plans that are fragile.     

Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers for the EU Global Strategy

EU High Representative Federica Mogherini presented her EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016. Encircled by security crises, it is difficult to think of something more important for Europe than collective action with the aim of weathering the storm. The EUGS, in this respect, seeks to define common ends and identify means. So what do we make of the EUGS? What does the EUGS tell us about the current role of the EU in global affairs? And how will the withdrawal of the UK from the EU affect foreign and security policy? As a way of introduction to the forum, this article notes that the EUGS focuses on the neighbourhood, puts the interests of European citizens first, identifies civilian means, and has created momentum on security policy. The key question, however, remains whether there is any interest in the EUGS beyond the foreign policy elites.